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Abstract 
This article examines the range of cultural events and activities promoted by the ruling 
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in the 2000s under the banner of 
the Third Chimurenga. It contributes to the lively debate on post-2000 cultural imaginings of a 
fetishised nation riddled by contestations over state power. The article posits that the version of 
‘cultural’ nationalism promoted as part of the Third Chimurenga emerged partly as a political 
response to the failures of ‘developmental’ nationalism of the 1980s and 1990s and partly as a 
continuation and intensification of the previous imaginings of Zimbabwe that began in the 1960s. 
Through a range of cultural activities, the ruling party sought to legitimise its continued rule of 
Zimbabwe in the face of the challenges posed to its rule by the increasingly popular Movement 
for Democratic Change (MDC) and the growing number of civil society organisations. Through 
the specific genre of the ‘music gala’, cultural nationalism came to attribute new meanings to 
concepts such as ‘independence,’ ‘heroes’ and ‘unity’ in the changed political context of the 
2000s. The gala effectively syncretised the elite memorialism of the 1980s and 1990s with the 
cultural practices of the 1970s liberation war. The revival of the project of cultural nationalism 
in the 2000s assisted ZANU-PF in deepening and strengthening the liberation war as 
Zimbabwe’s primary foundation myth. It also enabled the ruling party to delegitimise the MDC 
as a party without liberation war credentials and as a threat to the country’s ‘independence’ and 
‘unity’. This article tracks the roots of cultural nationalism prior to the 2000s, and analyses the 
forms that were promoted as part of the Third Chimurenga, with a specific focus on music galas, 
bashes and commemorations, in order to consider the type of nation that was being celebrated, 
performed and commemorated in post-2000 period.  
 
Introduction 
At the beginning of 2000, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) 
government, through the Ministry of Information and Publicity which was headed by Jonathan 
                                                 
1 The first version of this article was presented at The Cultural Images in and of Africa Workshop organised by the 
Nordic Africa Institute (Uppsala, Sweden) in collaboration with the Britain Zimbabwe Society (BZS), St. Anthony’s 
College, University of Oxford, 27 June 2008. 
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Moyo, mounted a profound cultural nationalist project that unfolded in tandem with the fast-
track land reform programme. This project comprised of a very elaborate media campaign 
carried primarily on the state broadcaster Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC). This 
article seeks to examine the meaning and significance of this project for post-2000 politics. It 
starts off with a historical explanation as to why Zimbabwe found itself in the throes of an 
aggressive state-sponsored cultural nationalism. A closer look at this cultural nationalism reveals 
both continuities and a re-packaging of ZANU-PF’s appeals to African culture and memories of 
the liberation war.2  
 
Cultural or political nationalism? 
Scholars such as John Hutchinson and Ernest Gellner have attempted to define cultural 
nationalism as separate from political nationalism. Hutchinson argued that ‘cultural nationalism 
is a movement of moral regeneration which seeks to re-unite the different aspects of the nation—
the traditional and modern, agriculture and industry, science and religion—by returning to the 
creative life-principle of the nation.’3 He specified his aim in these words:  
 
I propose to demonstrate that…there are two quite different types of nationalism—cultural and 
political—that must not be conflated, for they articulate different, even competing conceptions of the 
nation, from their own distinctive organisations, and have sharply diverging political strategies.4  
 
According to Hutchinson, political nationalists share with cultural nationalists an antipathy to the 
bureaucratic state. They tend to look to reason as their ethical source. Political nationalists 
conceive the nation as a ‘civic polity of educated citizens united by common laws and mores like 
the polis of classical antiquity.’5 The objectives of political nationalists are to ‘secure a 
representative state for their community so that it might participate as an equal in the developing 
cosmopolitan rationalist civilisation.’6 He added that: 
 
Political nationalists have as their objective the achievement of a representative national state that 
will guarantee to its members uniform citizenship rights. They tend to organise on legal-rational 
lines, forming centralised apparatuses in order to mobilise different groups against the existing polity 
and to direct them to this unitary end.7 
  
On the other hand, cultural nationalists perceive of the nation as a product of history and culture. 
To cultural nationalists, ‘nations are then not just political units but organic beings, living 
personalities, whose individuality must be cherished by their members in all their 
manifestations.’8 According to Hutchinson, cultural nationalists are not comfortable with 
political nationalists’ ideas of universal citizenship rights. They rather emphasise particularism as 
                                                 
2 N. Kriger, ‘From Patriotic Memories to ‘Patriotic History’ in Zimbabwe, 1990-2005,’ in Third World Quarterly, 
27, (6), (2006), p. 1164; T. Scarnecchia, The Urban Roots of Democracy and Political Violence in Zimbabwe: 
Harare and Highfield, 1940-1964, (University of Rochester Press, Rochester, 2008), pp. 1-15. 
3 J. Hutchinson, ‘Cultural Nationalism and Moral Regeneration,’ in J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith (eds.), 
Nationalism, (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1994), p. 123. 
4 Ibid, p. 122, 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid, p. 124. 
8 Ibid. 
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‘the dynamo of national creativity.’9 In short, cultural nationalists seek to inspire ‘love’ of 
community, educating members of community on their common national heritage of splendour 
and suffering, engaging in naming rituals, celebrating cultural uniqueness, and rejecting foreign 
practices.  
While Hutchinson and Gellner have made attempts to distinguish cultural and political 
nationalism, scholars focusing on the emergence of Zimbabwean nationalism have emphasised 
particular aspects of nationalism such as religion, peasant consciousness and post-war healing 
without necessarily making an effort to separate the political from the cultural.10 Similarly, this 
article considers that throughout the colonial and postcolonial period, political and cultural 
nationalism(s) were inextricably intertwined and impossible to disentangle from one another. 
Culture has been crucial ever since the idea of a Zimbabwean nation first became apparent in the 
1960s. Like Antonio Gramsci, we treat culture as pivotal in the reproduction of power. For 
Gramsci, hegemony cannot simply be produced through coercion but always needs to be 
balanced with consent. However, we agree with Gellner that culture is particularly pivotal during 
moments of crisis. As Gellner has argued, cultural nationalists should be understood as ‘moral 
innovators’ who establish ‘ideological movements at times of social crisis in order to transform 
the belief-systems of communities, and provide models of socio-political development that guide 
their modernising strategies.’11  
In the history of Zimbabwean nationalism, cultural performances and commemorations 
have been an essential part of ZANU-PF’s attempt to popularise a form of nationalist politics 
that spoke to the heart, ‘the politics of affect, emotion and drama, which we call the “politics of 
performance”.’12 John R. Gills has argued that ‘commemorative activity is by definition social 
and political, for it involves the coordination of individual and group memories, whose results 
may appear consensual when they are in fact the product of processes of intense contest, 
struggle, and, in some instances, annihilation’.13 With reference to the specific case of 
Zimbabwe, Thomas Turino has stated that: ‘Nation-building - the forging of national sentiment - 
largely involves cultural and artistic domains, with language, music-dance, sports, food, religion, 
and clothing style often being central. The use of art and other cultural practices to develop or 
maintain national sentiment for political purposes is termed cultural nationalism’14 
 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 D. Martin and P. Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War, (Zimbabwe Publishing House, 
Harare, 1981); M. Sithole, Zimbabwe: Struggles Within the Struggle: Second Edition, (Rujeko Publishers, Harare, 
1999); T. O. Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe, (Zimbabwe Publishing House, 
Harare, 1988); D. Lan, Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe, (Zimbabwe Publishing House, 
Harare, 1988); N. J. Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1992), J. Alexander, The Unsettled Land: State-Making & the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, 1893-2003, (James 
Currey, London, 2006); J. Alexander, J. McGregor and T. Ranger, Violence & Memory: One Hundred Years in the 
‘Dark Forests’ of Matabeleland, (James Currey, London, 2000); N. Bhebe, ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and 
the Evangelical Lutheran Church, (Mambo Press, Gweru, 1999); N. Bhebe, and T. Ranger (eds.), Soldiers in 
Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, (James Currey, Oxford, 1995); J. Nhongo-Simbanegavi, For Better or Worse? Women 
and ZANLA in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, (Weaver Press, Harare, 2000)  
11 E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983). 
12 J. C. Strauss and D. B. C. O’Brien, ‘Introduction,’ in Strauss and O’Brien (eds.), Staging Politics, (IB Tauris, 
London, 2007), p. 2. 
13 J. R. Gillis, ‘Introduction: Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship,’ in J. R. Gillis (ed.), 
Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994), p. 5. 
14 T. Turino, Nationalists, Cosmopolitans, and Popular Music in Zimbabwe (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
2000), p. 14. 
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The role of culture in the evolution of Zimbabwean nationalism 
The cultural aspects of the nationalist project of the early 2000s should not be treated in isolation 
from the historical emergence of Zimbabwean nationalism. Partha Chatterjee has pointed out that 
anti-colonial nationalism created its own domain of sovereignty within colonial society long 
before the battle with imperial power began.15 In his 1993 publication, Chatterjee emphasised 
how the cultural and spiritual sphere was the main domain within which anti-colonial 
nationalism emerged before it assumed political and militaristic features to fight imperial 
power.16 In other words, nationalists imagined a postcolonial nation long before fighting for its 
political realisation. As we shall see later in this article, these early imaginations made an 
important come-back in the early 2000s.  
Chatterjee provides a useful periodisation of the unfolding of anti-colonial nationalism 
into three stages which he describes as ‘moments’. The first stage is the ‘moment of departure’ 
which is characterised by the emergence of a nationalist leadership, the setting of goals of the 
nationalist movement and the effort to define the imagined postcolonial nation.17 In Zimbabwe, 
the period 1950-1963 could be understood as the ‘moment of departure’. Enocent Msindo has 
referred to this phase as the ‘golden age’ of nationalism because of the positive 
complementarities between ethnicity and nationalism. Msindo has noted that during this period, 
ethnically-based societies such as the Sons of Mashonaland Cultural Society, the Kalanga 
Cultural Society, the Monomotapa Offspring Society and the Matabele Home Society produced 
nationalist leaders while ethnic histories provided the needed pre-colonial heroes, heroines, 
monuments and local expressions of anti-colonial discontent.18 Advocates of nationalism drew 
from pre-colonial language and culture and reinterpreted pre-colonial histories as they mobilised 
across ethnic lines as fighters for independence. Early nationalists appealed to ethnic cultural 
symbols such as the leopard skins and fur hats worn by pre-colonial Shona and Ndebele chiefs, 
which leaders like Joshua Nkomo and Leopold Takawira often wore when addressing the 
masses.19  
It was also during the ‘moment of departure that a name for the imagined postcolonial 
nation was chosen: Zimbabwe.20 Peter Garlake has pointed out that this name was chosen as a 
nationalist response to white settler Rhodesian ‘cultural aggression’ that sought to deny Africans 
any historical achievements. According to Garlake, the name ‘Zimbabwe’ was ‘chosen to give a 
historical validity to the nation’.21 Emerging within a colonial settler milieu that aggressively 
                                                 
15 P. Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ, 1993), p. 6. 
16 Chatterjee, Nation and its Fragments, p. 6. 
17 Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. 
18 E. Msindo, ‘Ethnicity and Nationalism in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe: Bulawayo, 1950-1963,’ in Journal of 
African History, 48, (2007), pp. 276-279. 
19 Ibid. See also J. Muzondidya and S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Echoing Silences’: Ethnicity in Postcolonial Zimbabwe, 
1980-2007,’ in African Journal on Conflict Resolution: Special Issue on Identity and Cultural Diversity in Conflict 
Resolution in Africa, Vol. 7, (2), (Dec. 2007), p. 280. 
20 Oral History Index: Oral/2333 Interview with Lawrence Vambe by I. J. Johnstone of the National Archives of 
Zimbabwe, National Archives of Zimbabwe, June 1983. See also J. Fontein, The Silence of Great Zimbabwe: 
Contested Landscapes and the Power of Heritage, (London, University College of London Press, 2006), pp. 117-
139.  
21 P. Garlake, ‘Prehistory and Ideology in Zimbabwe,’ in J. D. Y. Peel and T. Ranger (eds.), Past & Present in 
Zimbabwe, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1983), p. 15. See also J. Fontein, The Silence of Great 
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denied Africans of history and culture, African nationalism inevitably unfolded as a cultural 
phenomenon. In its cultural manifestations, it became highly evangelical as it positioned itself as 
a counter-ideological, cultural and political movement to settler colonialism. 
Cultural nationalism reached its apogee during the celebration of the founding of the 
Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) on the 4th of March 1962 at Gwanzura Stadium in 
Highfield. Different forms of African traditional dances and songs graced the occasion, creating 
an inclusive image of a united imagined African nation.22 This was followed by the first ever 
‘Zimbabwe Festival of African Culture’, organised by the Zimbabwe Traditional and Cultural 
Club (affiliated to ZAPU) in May 1963. Activities of this festival included a dress show whose 
aim was to find a new national dress that could be called the ‘Dress of Zimbabwe’.23 Cultural 
nationalism had taken root and the imagined nation was being performed and commemorated 
through the wearing of fur hats, carrying of traditional walking sticks, traditional music and 
dance.  
The phase of the ‘moment of departure’ closed with a dramatic symbolic event in 1962 
that took place at the airport, when Joshua Nkomo returned from a trip abroad and was met by 
ninety-year old Mr. Nyamasoka Chinamhora, uncle to Chief Chinamhora and veteran of the First 
Chimurenga (1896-1897). Chinamhora handed over a war-axe, sword and knobkerrie to Nkomo, 
encouraging him to fight to the bitter end.24 This event marked the crucial role of the cultural 
aspects of the First Chimurenga in legitimising the ‘moment of departure’ of the nationalist 
project. The war-axe was an important symbol of the living spirit of African resistance. Despite 
these signs of unity against the colonial aggressor, the emergence of cultural nationalism was 
severely affected by a split among nationalists in 1963 that was followed by a period of inter-
nationalist violence as well as an intensification of colonial repression under the reactionary 
Rhodesian Front (RF) government of Ian Smith. ZAPU and ZANU were banned and the 
nationalist leaders thrown into detention for the next ten years.  
These developments set the stage for the next phase of the nationalist struggle, the 
‘moment of manoeuvre’, which involved the beginning of the armed struggle and the building of 
rear military bases in Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique. During the armed struggle, 
cultural nationalism played itself out in exile and in the rural areas where the guerrilla fighters 
operated. Musicians such as Comrade Chinx and the Light Machine Gun Choir led the 
Chimurenga Songs/Ingoma zeNkululeko (Liberation War Songs) in Mozambique and Zambia 
respectively. Thomas Mapfumo performed Chimurenga Songs inside Rhodesia to the chagrin of 
colonial authorities.25 In the rural theatres of the struggle, Chimurenga music became an 
important mobilising, motivating and conscientising cultural tool, particularly for ZANU’s 
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). Songs featured during nightly 
gatherings held by guerrilla fighters (pungwe in chiShona) and also on programmes broadcasted 
via shortwave guerrilla radio stations such as ZANU’s ‘The Voice of Zimbabwe’ (based in 
Mozambique) and ZAPU’s ‘Voice of the Revolution’ (based in Zambia).  
                                                                                                                                                             
Zimbabwe: Contested Landscapes and the Power of Heritage, (London, University College of London Press, 2006), 
pp. 117-139. 
22 African Parade, 1962. 
23 African Parade, 1963, p. 8. The idea of a ‘national dress’ was revived in the post-2000 period by Aeneas 
Chigwedere. 
24 Daily News, 30 July 1962. 
25 B. Chinamhora, ‘African Popular Music,’ in K. Sayce (ed.), Tabex Encyclopaedia Zimbabwe, (Quest Publishing, 
Harare, 1987), pp. 261-263. 
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In 1980, Zimbabwe entered the crucial ‘moment of arrival’ that saw ZANU-PF taking 
over the state and making efforts to mobilise the general population behind a vanguardist party 
and a vanguardist developmental state. During this phase, the state created such institutions as 
the Ministry of Education, Arts and Culture, the Zimbabwe Arts Council and the National Dance 
Company as part of its efforts to carry over nationalist-revolutionary messages. The liberation 
war served as the main foundation myth of the new nation. Radio programmes were introduced 
that played liberation songs such as Dzimbodze Chimurenga Dzakasunungura (‘Chimurenga 
Songs Liberated Zimbabwe’ in chiShona). The new government changed the old Rhodesian 
names of roads, streets, public buildings, towns, and parks, replacing these with nationalist-
oriented ones. Furthermore, it also introduced a number of national public holidays which served 
to celebrate the country’s independence (Independence Day on 18 April), to remember those 
who had died during the liberation struggle (Heroes Day in August), and to mark the successes 
of Zimbabwe’s defence forces (Defence Forces Day in August). National days were marked with 
militarised official mass ceremonies in sport stadia. 
 The fragility of the new nation soon, however, became apparent in the early 1980s with 
the growing fall-out between the two former liberation movements, ZANU and ZAPU. Ex-
ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo enjoyed significant support in Matabeleland. During the liberation 
war, he led ZAPU while Mugabe headed ZANU but in 1980 he lost against Mugabe in 
Zimbabwe’s first elections. In the early 1980s, ZANU increasingly revealed its intentions to 
establish a one-party state and began to represent Nkomo as a ‘dissident’ leader responsible for 
destabilising of the country.26 In order to eliminate ZAPU ‘dissidents,’ the government sent the 
Korean-trained Fifth Brigade into Matabeleland and the Midlands in the early 1980s which 
resulted into deaths of over twenty thousand civilians.27 The signing of the Unity Accord in 1987 
brought an end to the violence and Nkomo was appointed as Vice-President, a position he held 
until his death in 1999.  
Against the background of government’s efforts to create a one-party state, the nation 
was increasingly imagined as a ‘Shona-centred’ and ‘ZANU-PF-centred’ nation which excluded 
PF-ZAPU and Ndebele-speaking communities. This was indicated for example by the initiation 
of an ethno-centric dance-drama called Mbuya Nehanda - The Spirit of Liberation, which was 
created to coincide with the second anniversary of Zimbabwe’s Independence in 1982.28 
Criticism also targeted the national broadcaster ZBC which was accused of producing several 
documentaries about the history of ZANU but neglecting ZAPU. As ZAPU leader Joshua 
Nkomo pointed out: ‘I wonder how ZIPRA’s disabled heroes feel when they hear ZBC say only 
ZANLA fighters fought during our struggle?’29 ZAPU followers even launched a protest in front 
                                                 
26 In the early 1980s, ZAPU was accused of plotting a war against the newly independent government. The 
government’s military operation in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces in the early 1980s – also known as 
Gukurahundi - was justified by government under the premise of creating a unified nation in which there was no 
dissidence. Gukurahundi resulted in a large number of deaths, many of whom were civilians instead of former 
ZIPRA cadres, thereby questioning the government’s motives behind the military operation 
27 Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace & Legal Resources Foundation, Breaking the Silence: Building True 
Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands Regions, 1980-1988, (CCJP & LRF, 
Harare, 1997).  
28 Turino, Nationalists, Cosmopolitans, and Popular Music in Zimbabwe, p. 323. 
29 Quoted in: J. Zaffiro, Media & democracy in Zimbabwe, 1931-2002, (Colorado Springs, CO: International 
Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 79. 
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of ZBC’s Bulawayo studio because they felt ZBC only aired ZANLA liberation war songs and 
failed to broadcast ZIPRA songs.30 
ZANU-PF’s efforts to make itself central to the birth of the nation were also expressed in 
the declaration of ‘national heroes’ to commemorate those who had actively contributed towards 
the liberation struggle. After independence, the government constructed a national Heroes’ Acre 
in Harare as well as equivalent official burial grounds for ‘provincial’ and ‘district’ heroes. 
Those who posthumously are declared ‘national heroes’ by government are buried in a state-
funded funeral at Heroes’ Acre and the status entitles widows and relatives of the deceased to a 
state pension. This hierarchical system of elite memorialism has been marked by numerous 
contestations over who deserves ‘hero status’.31 In relation to the politics around the conferral of 
hero status, Kriger has argued that “public debates about war heroes have merely reflected the 
tensions in Zimbabwean society and politics, and have highlighted how fragile national authority 
and national unity are in a new nation”.32  
Apart from these official commemorative ceremonies, the government did not heavily 
invest in cultural activities in the immediate post-independent period. The ZANU-PF 
government primarily legitimised its rule by referring to its aim to bring about ‘development’ for 
the majority black population and to redress colonial injustices. In many ways, the new 
government enjoyed obvious legitimacy in 1980 after a long protracted struggle for liberation. It 
did not find it necessary to resort to cultural activities in order to justify its rule but instead 
primarily defined its role in economic terms.  
The nationalism of the 1980s should primarily be understood as a developmental 
nationalism coded in Marxist-Leninist rhetoric of scientific socialism. In practical terms, the 
ZANU-PF government underpinned its Marxist-Leninist political rhetoric with drawing up 
impressive five-year development plans as the foundation of the socialist transformation of the 
colonial political economy that had left the majority of Africans enveloped by poverty. Under the 
government’s policy of Growth with Equity, it was stated that ‘economic exploitation of the 
majority by the few, the grossly uneven infrastructure and productive development of the rural 
and urban distribution sectors …and the consequent grossly inequitable pattern of income 
distribution and of benefits to the overwhelming majority of this country, stands as a serious 
indictment of our society’.33 Developmental nationalism was pushed forward through the 
adoption of a Transitional National Development Plan in 1982 that was underpinned by socialist 
transformation as a strategy to reduce poverty and to fulfil the liberation war promises.34 It was 
under developmental nationalism that Zimbabwe attained the highest standards of education and 
was hailed as a successful transitional state. The early 1980s also witnessed some successful and 
orderly land reforms and resettlement of peasants on newly bought farms.  
                                                 
30 Ibid, p. 105. 
31 R. P. Werbner, ‘Smoke from the barrel of a gun: postwars of the dead, memory and reinscription in Zimbabwe’, in 
R. P. Werbner (ed.), Memory and the postcolony: African anthropology and the critique of power (London, Zed 
Books, 1998). 
32 N. Kriger, ‘The politics of creating national heroes: the search for political legitimacy and national identity’, in N. 
Bhebhe & T. Ranger (eds.), Soldiers in Zimbabwe's liberation war (Harare, University of Zimbabwe Publications, 
1995), p. 162. 
33 Government of Zimbabwe, Growth and Equity: An Economic Policy Statement, (Government Printers, Harare, 
1981). See also L. Sachikonye, ‘From Growth with Equity’ to ‘Fast Track’ Reform: Zimbabwe’s Land Question,’ in 
Review of African Political Economy, 96, (2003), pp. 227-240.  
34 Government of Zimbabwe, Transitional National Development Plan: 1982/3-1984-5: Volume One, (Government 
Printer, Harare, 1982). 
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While ZANU-PF projected itself as a radical socialist vanguard party, the developmental 
nationalism that it espoused remained locked within fiscally conservative, export-oriented 
structures inherited from colonialism. State-interventionist programmes that included 
government-sponsored agrarian reform and import-substitution industrialisation were expected to 
result in an equitable distribution of national assets and incomes. But like the case with all 
postcolonial governments, the ZANU-PF government’s drive for an eradication of poverty 
remained constrained by the reliance on or acquiescence to global capital. As a result of these 
constraints, the government was not able to fulfil its ambitious development projects. Worse still, 
the political economy of developmental nationalism became compromised by corruption and an 
accrual of riches to a few politically connected classes.  
By the 1990s, the developmental aspects of nationalism stagnated and the first signs of 
state failure to deliver on material promises became apparent.35 Economic growth stagnated and 
the ZANU-PF government was forced to adopt the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ESAP) that was overseen by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While ESAP met with stiff 
resistance from workers and students, the ZANU-PF government insisted that it was a home-
grown developmental initiative meant to increase economic growth. By 1997, ESAP had caused 
more problems and had failed to deliver economic growth. ZANU-PF government had to 
officially abandoned it. Meanwhile, the disastrous economic consequences of ESAP created 
many enemies for the ZANU-PF government, ranging from retrenched workers, starving college 
and university students and other suffering constituencies, including the war veterans. Some 
began to blame nationalism as an ideology that had served its purpose and needed to be replaced 
by a post-nationalist dispensation attentive to global trends.36.  
 
Cultural nationalism as compensation for state failure (2000-2008) 
Across Africa, failing regimes like that of Mobutu in Zaire have resorted to cultural nationalism 
as a way of managing society.37 In the midst of diminishing economic resources and a failure to 
deliver material goods to citizens, governments facing a crisis of legitimacy have fallen back on 
culture in an attempt to renew themselves. In a context in which the legitimacy of the ZANU-PF 
government was increasingly contested, the nationalist struggle proved a valuable resource for 
ZANU-PF in order to rejustify its rule, particularly in the face of an opposition party that drew 
large support from white Zimbabweans, civil society organisations and major world powers such 
as the United States and the United Kingdom. It was at this conjuncture that cultural nationalism 
became an important project for the ZANU-PF government to re-assert its anti-colonial message 
in the face of new ‘imperial threats’ embodied by the opposition Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC). While the expropriation of land provided ZANU-PF with some material 
resources in the struggle for power, culture emerged as an ideological resource that could easily 
be mobilised for political survival. The cultural nationalist project of the early 2000s should thus 
be interpreted as one of the ways through which the ZANU-PF government attempted to 
compensate for the failure of the developmental nationalism of the 1980s that had sought to 
                                                 
35 S. Dansereau, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Zimbabwe’s Development Impasse,’ in H. Melber (ed.), 
Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Decline, (Discussion Paper, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, 2005) 
36 In March 2000 Morgan Tsvangirai openly declared that the MDC was not inspired by nationalism and that it 
sought to build a post-nationalist dispensation. To him nationalism was now captive to a time warp and cronyism. It 
had become an end in itself. See P. Bond, ‘Radical Rhetoric and the Working Class During Zimbabwean 
Nationalism’s Dying Days,’ in Journal of World-Systems Research, VII, (i), (Spring 2001), pp. 52-89. 
37 F. de Boeck, ‘Postcolonialism, Power and Identity: Local and Global Perspectives from Zaire,’ in R. Werbner and 
T. Ranger (eds.), Postcolonial Identities in Africa, (Zed Books, London and New Jersey, 1996), pp. 75-99.  
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transform the settler colonial economic system, to reduce poverty among workers and peasants 
and to initiate sustainable economic development of the country as part of the fulfilment of 
liberation struggle promises.  
The emergent cultural nationalism of the 2000s was partly a response to the post-Cold 
War global ideologies of human rights, democracy and neo-liberalism and ideals such as 
pluralism and cosmopolitanism. ZANU-PF’s post-2000 discourse openly disparaged democracy 
and human rights as part of alien values that were potentially subversive of national sovereignty. 
However, it was also a reflection of the ideological shifts that had taken place within the ZANU-
PF government. While the newly independent government in 1980 emphasised a plural and civic 
conception of the nation, this has been transformed into Afro-radicalism and a nativist 
interpretation of the nation in the face of the growing opposition in the early 2000s. This shift 
was accompanied with a revival of anti-colonial rhetoric and a careful re-packing of the land 
question not only as an economic issue but also as a fundamental part of Zimbabwe’s cultural 
heritage. Land played a central role in the cultural and symbolic project of the Third 
Chimurenga. The material importance of land was well expressed in ZANU-PF’s campaign 
slogan “land is the economy, the economy is land”.  
 A crucial element of the resuscitation of nationalism in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s was 
the intensification of government-sponsored cultural activities which, under the pretext of 
celebrating ‘the all-inclusive nation’, sought to gather support for ZANU-PF’s agenda and 
discredit the MDC. As argued by Askew with reference to Tanzania, ‘performing the nation’ 
included the repackaging of romanticised culture as a hand-maiden of a particular mode of 
politics.38 In Zimbabwe, this performance took the form of range of bashes, galas and 
commemorations as well as a dramatisation of ZANU-PF’s legitimacy as founded on the 
liberation struggle through well-selected television documentaries, a revival of Chimurenga 
music and carefully crafted political speeches. Performing the nation involved the conflation of 
state, nation, ruling party and the person of Robert Mugabe into one symbol of national 
sovereignty that needed to be jealously guarded. It ranged from singing a national anthem to the 
wearing (by the ZANU-PF Women’s League) of identical dresses with Mugabe’s portrait 
emblazoned on the fabric.39  
The national broadcaster ZBC, which held a monopoly on the airwaves, played a central 
role in beaming the performances and commemorations into the homes of Zimbabweans. In the 
early 2000s, the broadcaster was increasingly incorporated into the state project of cultural 
nationalism, particularly after the introduction of ZBC’s new strategy ‘Vision 30’ in November 
2001. Through Vision 30, the broadcaster sought ‘to provide world-class quality programmes 
and services that reflect, develop, foster and respect the Zimbabwean national identity, character, 
cultural diversity, national aspirations and Zimbabwean and Pan-African values.’40 Vision 30 
brought into effect the local content conditions which were part of the Broadcasting Services Act 
that was introduced in April 2001. This Act stipulated that 75 percent of television content 
should consist of local and African material, while 75 percent of radio content should comprise 
                                                 
38 K. M. Askew, Performing the Nation: Swahili Music and Cultural Politics in Tanzania, (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 2002), p. 14. 
39 Ibid, pp 290-291. 
40 Advert in ZBC relaunch supplement, The Herald, 30 November 2001. 
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Zimbabwean music. The local content conditions resulted in the removal of foreign soaps, music 
and news programmes but led to the flourishing of a new music genre named ‘urban grooves’.41  
Vision 30 also saw the launch of a range of televised ‘galas’ (i.e. music festivals) which 
commemorated a number of historical events, national days or politicians who had played an 
important role in the liberation struggle. The galas served to popularise the celebration of 
national days such as Independence Day, Heroes’ Day and Unity Day. They also sought to 
commemorate and mark the contribution of crucial ‘national heroes’ such as Joshua Nkomo and 
Simon Muzenda. These music festivals, which were broadcast live on television and radio, 
constituted an important part of ZANU-PF’s mediation of patriotic history and sought to 
popularise a particular version of national identity.42 While they were strongly associated with 
government and the ruling party, the galas did not tend to make explicit references to ZANU-PF 
nor were they always used by government politicians to make speeches. As compared to the 
official annual commemoration of national days such as Independence Day and Heroes’ Day, the 
political message of the galas was more subtle and served to indirectly back up ZANU-PF’s 
agenda. They sought to complement the more formal commemorative ceremonies of national 
days which had been introduced in the 1980s. The music galas were ZANU-PF’s attempts to 
forge a consciousness based on its narrow version of the ‘party-nation’.  
Reinforcing the link with sovereignty and the liberation war, galas were announced as 
pungwes. For example, an article in The Herald argued that ‘musical galas are the reincarnation 
of the night vigils (pungwes) that whipped people into common liberation thinking and kept 
them informed, educated and united.’43 Thus, while government in the 1980s and early 1990s 
primarily understood the nation as an economic entity that had inherited colonial inequities 
which the new government was going to rectify, the failure of this developmental nationalism in 
the early 2000s and resultant loss of state legitimacy forced government to resort to a cultural 
justification. The cultural practices of the liberation war constituted the main basis for the revival 
of cultural nationalism.  
The galas became an important platform for government-sponsored musicians part of the 
Third Chimurenga music album series as well as for the new ‘urban grooves’ generation of 
musicians. Lesser known theatre ensembles and dance groups performing ‘traditional’ dance 
were also part of the line-up. Well-known and best-selling musicians who fitted none of these 
categories often faced a difficult decision when invited whether or not to participate in the galas. 
Association with galas - and thereby with the ruling party - could be damaging to those fans 
supporting the opposition but not participating could, on the other hand, result in less airplay on 
the national broadcaster which was controlled by government. For example, musician Andy 
Brown lost significant popular support after he associated himself with the Third Chimurenga 
project. In early 2005, popular artist Oliver Mtukudzi swiftly distanced himself from the ruling 
party after it was reported he performed in a private bash to celebrate Joice Mujuru’s 
appointment as Vice-President. The galas were an important means through which musicians 
could distribute and publicise their music on radio and television. In the context of a severe 
                                                 
41 ‘Urban grooves’ artists comprise musicians such as Flash Gordon, Decibel, Sanii Makhalima, Roy and Royce, 
David Chifunyise, Roqui, Leonard Mapfumo, Betty Makaya, Extra Large and Maskiri. ‘Urban grooves’ heavily 
draws from American music genres such as Rap, Hip Hop and R&B but song lyrics are mostly in local languages 
such as chiShona or siNdebele. 
42 D. Gandhi and L. Jambaya, Towards A National Agenda on ZBC: Vision 30 Revisited, (Media Monitoring Project 
of Zimbabwe, Harare, 2002). 
43 Guvamombe, Isdore, Galas a reincarnation of pungwes, The Herald, 26 July 2005. 
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economic crisis, musicians therefore often creatively manoeuvred between participating in state 
music events and offering critical social commentary on the situation in the country.  
 
Galas, bashes and the politics of commemorating the ‘nation’ 
While the revival of cultural nationalism in the early 2000s popularised the post-independence 
elite memorialism of the 1980s and 1990s, it most obviously drew from the cultural practices of 
the 1970s liberation war. Immediately after independence, the new ZANU-PF government 
adopted a policy of racial reconciliation but this was largely abandoned in the early 2000s. The 
post-2000 period saw the re-emergence of the race trope and the anti-imperialist discourse that 
had been part of the liberation struggle.44 Race featured as a central element in ZANU-PF’s 
revival of nationalism. As Brian Raftopoulos has argued: ‘One of the central features of the 
Zimbabwean crisis, as it unfolded since 2000, has been the emergence of a revived nationalism 
delivered in a particularly virulent form, with race as a key trope within the discourse, and a 
selective rendition of the liberation history deployed as an ideological policing agent in the 
public debate’.45 White Zimbabweans were excluded from official versions of the nation. They 
were portrayed as part of the opposition MDC which according to government sought to counter 
radical reform and re-instate colonial rule.  
The re-definition of white minorities as enemies of Zimbabwe was accompanied with 
efforts to incorporate youth through a combination of coercion and consent. The establishment of 
‘National Youth Training Service Centres’ served to indoctrinate youth with ‘official 
nationalism’ at its cultural insurrection phase.46 The toughest job for ZANU-PF at the beginning 
of 2000 was to foster ‘patriotism’ founded on the memory of the liberation struggle on the youth 
who had not experienced the liberation struggle. Coercion as a strategy of retaining power was 
coming under serious criticism and was proving inadequate as a political survival strategy. The 
televised galas popularised official versions of the nation through music, a medium which was 
particularly suitable to engage the so-called ‘born-frees’ (those born after 1980) who had not 
experienced the liberation struggle and the hardship of colonialism. Young Zimbabweans had to 
be re-educated so as to appreciate the importance of the liberation struggle. While the pungwe of 
the 1970s sought to convince youth to join the liberation struggle, the music gala of the early 
2000s was aimed at hailing young Zimbabweans as patriotic supporters of the ruling party. The 
incorporation of popular ‘urban grooves’ musicians into galas would guarantee a young audience 
who during the gala would not only be subjected to ‘urban grooves’ but also to the revived 
Chimurenga songs of the liberation war. 
 The cultural nationalism of the early 2000s thus in important ways continued the cultural 
practices of the liberation struggle. Galas proved a useful resource to emphasise the contribution 
of ZANU-PF to the liberation of Zimbabwe and to discredit the MDC. The following sections 
discuss the way in which the gala syncretised the elite memorialism of the 1980s with the 
cultural practice of the 1970s pungwe. Through the galas, concepts such as ‘independence’, 
‘heroes’ and ‘unity’ obtained a new relevance in the particular political context of the 2000s in 
which ZANU-PF’s legitimacy was increasingly challenged by the opposition MDC.  
                                                 
44 Kriger, ‘From Patriotic Memories to ‘Patriotic History in Zimbabwe,’ pp. 1164-1166. 
45 B. Raftopoulos, ‘Nation, Race and History in Zimbabwean Politics,’ in S. Dorman, D. Hammet & P. Nugent 
(eds.), Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa, (Brill Publishers, Leiden and Boston, 
2007), p. 101.  
46 The Solidarity Peace Trust, National Youth Service Training-Shaping Youths in a Truly Zimbabwean Manner’: An 
Overview of Youth Militia Training and Activities in Zimbabwe, October 200-August 2003, (The Solidarity Peace 
Trust, 5 September 2003).  
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Independence Day 
In the 2000s, ‘independence’ no longer merely referred to the year 1980 when Zimbabwe 
obtained independence from colonial rule but it had been given renewed meaning by ZANU-PF 
in the face of an emerging opposition party which was portrayed as an agent of the British 
government and white Zimbabwean ‘Rhodies’ who threatened the sovereignty of the nation. 
Tony Blair was accorded a central place in ZANU-PF’s campaign as he was considered to be the 
main instigator and supporter of the opposition party MDC.47 While Zimbabwe was formally 
independent, election campaigns of the ruling party stressed that the country’s sovereignty was 
again under threat because of the rising popularity of the MDC which was backed by major 
world powers, and Britain in particular. 
Both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ meanings of independence were mediated through the annual 
‘Independence Gala’ which was broadcasted live on ZBC. For example, during the ‘More Fire 
Independence Gala’ held in Harare in April 2002, musician Last Chiangwa (also known as 
‘Tambaoga’) performed a song called ‘Agirimendi’ (‘agreement’ in chiShona). In the song, 
Tambaoga attacked Britain’s attempts to ‘recolonise’ Zimbabwe and mocked Tony Blair who he 
referred to as “The only Blair that I know is a toilet”. ‘Blair toilets’ commonly refer to pit 
latrines in Zimbabwe which are prevalent in the rural areas. The song fitted well with ZANU-
PF’s focus on Blair’s attempts to re-establish Zimbabwe as a British colony and endorsed the 
‘new’ meaning the government attached to ‘independence’.  
The ‘Silver Jubilee’ celebrations in 2005, on the other hand, which marked 25 years of 
independence, expressed the older meaning of independence and the role of the liberation 
struggle in this regard. The celebrations, which were extensively televised on ZBC, included an 
award ceremony which conferred “the country’s highest national honours and awards on 
Zimbabweans and foreign nationals who distinguished themselves in different fields and service 
to the liberation of Zimbabwe and its general socio-economic development”.48 Among those 
honoured with a Silver Jubilee award were former presidents of the ‘frontline states’ such as 
Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda, Mozambique’s Samora Machel, 
Botswana’s Seretse Khama and Angola’s Agosthinho Neto and Zimbabwean nationalists such as 
Leopold Takawira, Samuel Parirenyatwa, Joshua Nkomo, Simon Muzenda and Bernard 
Chidzero. 
The extensive celebrations of Independence Day in the 2000s thus sought to emphasise 
the achievements made by ZANU-PF during the liberation war and ultimately conferred 
legitimacy on the party to continue its rule over Zimbabwe. The opposition party MDC was 
considered as the antithesis of ‘independence’. The majority of MDC representatives had no 
strong links with the liberation war. Worse still, MDC accommodated white Zimbabweans in its 
ranks and this enabled ZANU-PF to link the opposition to Rhodesian and British interests. A 
vote to MDC was equated with a threat to independence. In this political context, Independence 
                                                 
47 The sour relations between Mugabe and Blair date back to October 1997 when Mugabe approached Britain for 
funds to finance a land reform redistribution programme during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
(CHOGM) in Edinburgh. Further damage to the relationship between the two governments was done in that year 
through a letter written by the previous Secretary for International Development Clare Short to the Zimbabwe 
Minister for Agriculture, Kumbirai Kangai in which she stated the following: “I should make it clear that we do not 
accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new 
Government from diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial interests. My own origins are Irish and as 
you know we were colonised not colonisers”. See: Short, C. (2002) ‘How it all started’, New African 40(5), p. 10. 
48 Silver Jubilee: Zim to honours distinguished individuals, The Herald, 15 April 2005. 
 13 
Day therefore proved a suitable occasion for ZANU-PF to justify its continued presence in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Heroes’ Day 
The main aim of the annual Heroes’ Day celebrations is to remember the ‘fallen heroes’ of the 
liberation struggle. In 2002, the official annual celebrations were supplemented with a range of 
televised music galas that both served to commemorate the liberation war and its victims and to 
raise awareness about the war among the younger generation of ‘born-frees’. In August 2002, the 
first ‘Heroesplush’ gala took place in Chinhoyi and hereby complemented the official Heroes’ 
Day celebrations in Rufaro Stadium in Harare. The choice of this location was significant 
because Chinhoyi had been the site of the famous ‘Battle of Sinoia’ on 28 April 1966 between 
ZANLA forces and the Rhodesian Security Forces.49 To ZANU-PF, this day effectively marked 
the start of the armed struggle. In addition to the galas held around Heroes’ Day, the government 
also sponsored a one-off music festival in Chimoio, Mozambique in October 2004 which was 
dubbed the ‘Solidarity Bash’. Chimoio served as an important military base for ZANLA forces 
in the liberation war. On 23 November 1977, Rhodesian forces attacked the base and killed an 
estimated 3,000 guerrilla fighters. The event served to commemorate those who died in the 
massacre and also sought to mark good relations between Zimbabwe and Mozambique that dated 
back to the liberation struggle. The Minister for Information and Publicity, Jonathan Moyo, 
justified the event by stating that ‘We should pay homage and celebrate the solidarity. This is yet 
another way of recalling our Independence’ and branded those who criticised the event as 
‘enemies and merchants of confusion’.50 The locations chosen for Heroesplush in 2002 and the 
Solidarity bash in 2004 implicitly served to emphasise the contribution of ZANU-PF and 
ZANLA forces towards the liberation struggle. Both Chinhoyi and Chimoio were places where 
particularly ZANU-PF and ZANLA had fought. The absence of similar celebrations in ZAPU or 
ZIPRA bases indirectly silenced their role in the liberation war.51 
The revival of commemorations of liberation war victims should be understood in the 
changed context of the 2000s during which Heroes’ Day regained a specific relevance. Firstly, 
because of the increased importance of the political constituency of war veterans who had 
successfully negotiated for a pension scheme in 1999 and hereby obtained a higher public and 
political profile. Their role was constantly emphasised and their symbolic value proved useful for 
government in order to legitimise actions such as the occupation of commercial farms and more 
generally conferred legitimacy on ZANU-PF to rule the country.52 Ex-combatants who had 
fought for land during the war merely returned to complete the unfinished business of the 
Lancaster House Agreement. Because of its contribution to the liberation war, ZANU-PF was the 
only legitimate party to rule the country as sovereignty was not guaranteed if other parties would 
come into power. 
Secondly, the notion of ‘hero’ served to reinforce a clear distinction between on the one 
hand the ‘true patriots’ and on the other hand the ‘sell-outs’ who threatened Zimbabwe’s 
                                                 
49 Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, pp. 25-30. 
50 Mbiriyamveka, Jonathan, Zim-Mozambique solidarity bash roars into life, The Herald, 11 October 2004. 
51 A. M. Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, 1961-87: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern 
Rhodesia, (Africa World Press, Trenton, 2005). 
52 N. Kriger, ‘Zimbabwe: Political constructions of war veterans,’ in Review of African Political Economy, 30(96), 
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sovereignty.53 According to government minister Witness Mangwende, it was ‘a revolutionary 
duty for a son and daughter of Zimbabwe to come to the Heroes’ Acre to honour their heroes 
who brought them the hard-won independence’.54 But ‘Heroes’ Day’ was not a mere neutral 
state ceremony but had become closely associated with ZANU-PF. For example, during the 2003 
official Heroes’ Day celebrations, President Mugabe urged the opposition party MDC to 
‘repent’: ‘Those who would go together with our enemies abroad cannot at the same time want to 
march alongside us as our partners in the nation-building efforts that are underway. We say no to 
them, they must first repent. There is room for them to repent, there is room for them to say we 
were wrong yesterday, we shall not be wrong tomorrow.’55  
The notion of ‘hero’ thus did not merely refer to the past but had a clear bearing upon the 
present of the 2000s in which the MDC was considered to pose an illegitimate challenge to the 
exclusive claim of ZANU-PF to rule the country because of its ‘non-existent’ liberation war 
credentials. The continued importance of Zimbabweans to follow the spirit of ‘its gallant sons 
and daughters’ in fighting imperialism was emphasised by Mugabe in another speech during 
Heroes’ Day in 2004: 
 
This National Shrine [Heroes’ Acre], as indeed are the district and provincial and other shrines 
where our fallen heroes lie, is a place of renewal and re-dedication that strengthens our resolve and 
pledge that Zimbabwe shall never be a colony again. For, as we look at the pantheon of heroes and 
heroines who make our roll call today, what greater challenge, what greater patriotism is there, than 
to faithfully and resolutely guard that which cost us tens of thousands of lives to achieve? Where 
would our honour be if we were intimidated by imperialism’s tired trickery into letting go of our 
sacred land?56 
 
Indirectly, Mugabe hereby referred to the disservice Zimbabweans would do to its ‘fallen heroes’ 
by supporting the opposition party MDC which would bring back ‘colonialism’ and hereby 
threaten the very independence that those who participated in the liberation war had fought for. 
The category of ‘hero’ thus became restricted to loyal members of ZANU-PF. In another address 
in Victoria Falls in July 2005, Mugabe again reinforced the distinction between 
‘heroes’/’patriots’ and ‘sell outs’/’stooges’ along party lines: 
 
We have always said we don’t want stooges and puppets working day and night to effect regime 
change with our former colonial masters. So that’s the difference between us and the MDC. Zanu-PF 
is a revolutionary party while the MDC are counter-revolutionaries and reactionaries. For us in 
Zanu-PF, the power of the Government, the President and his ministers comes from the people of 
Zimbabwe. For the MDC, they derive their power from Mr. Blair. So there you are. You have a 
choice. Where do you stand? On the side of the people, or the British? If you stand with the British, 
you are not one of us you are a sell out, a stooge.57 
 
The association of national heroes with ZANU-PF was further supported by the incorporation of 
‘new’ heroes who had not necessarily actively participated in the Second Chimurenga but who 
                                                 
53 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Puppets or Patriots! A Study of Nationalist Rivalry Over the Spoils of Dying Settler 
Colonialism in Zimbabwe, 1977-1980,’ in W. J. Burszta, T. Kamusella & S. Wojciechowski (eds.), Nationalisms 
Across the Globe: An Overview of Nationalisms in State-Endowed and Stateless Nations: Volume II: The World, 
(School of Humanities and Journalism, Poznan, 2006), pp. 345-398. 
54 Thousands Expected At Heroes’ Commemorations, The Herald, 9 August 2004. 
55 President Implores MDC to Repent, The Herald, 16 August 2003. 
56 Time to Remember Gallant Liberators, The Herald, 10 August 2004. 
57 Madonko, Innocent, Remain United – President, The Herald, 15 July 2005. 
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were loyal party members. Heroes’ Acre began to incorporate ‘new’ heroes who had played an 
instrumental role in the Third Chimurenga. For example, although he did not have identifiable 
liberation war credentials, Chenjerai Hunzvi was declared a ‘national hero’ after his death in 
May 2001 for his leadership in the occupation of commercial farms in 2000. Hence, what 
constituted a national hero did no longer strictly refer to past contributions but also incorporated 
the present and particularly loyalty to the party in the 2000s.58 
 Apart from commemorating old heroes from the liberation struggle, young Zimbabweans 
were invited to become ‘new heroes’. In August 2001, the government introduced a formal 
‘National Youth Service’ training programme which was the brainchild of the late Minister of 
Youth, Gender and Employment, Border Gezi. Gezi introduced the programme in a government 
policy document in October 2000 but could not witness the implementation of his ideas as he 
died in a car accident in April 2001.59 The programme saw the establishment of a range of youth 
training camps throughout the country. Based on a speech delivered by Vice-President Simon 
Muzenda during the graduation of over 2,000 youth at Dadaya training centre in the Midlands, 
The Herald summarised the aims of the training programme as follows: 
 
The national youth service training programme is a Government nation-building programme that has 
been designed to correctly inform our youths of their history and more importantly to equip them 
with skills that enable them to survive the socio-economic challenges facing Zimbabwe as a 
previously colonized developing nation […]. The modules delivered to youths during the training 
demystify what many of our youths have been misled to believe, that Africans and their culture are 
inferior to other inhabitants of this earth, more so to Europeans. The programme impresses in the 
minds of our young Zimbabwean citizens the basic human and democratic principles of equality, 
equity and individual freedom. It is geared towards boosting the self-worth image of the youth as an 
independent and self-reliant generation that is knowledgeable of its own roots, patriotic, and ready to 
defend its right to existence on planet earth.60 
 
While the government denied that the programme was a partisan project that served to further 
ZANU-PF’s political agenda, the programme provided the party with a trained youth militia – 
popularly known as ‘green bombers’ - that has been deployed on a number of occasions to serve 
the ruling party, e.g. in government elections and in the distribution of food.  
 In order to popularise and revive the role of the liberation war among youth, a musical 
event termed ‘Freedom Youth Hangout’ was organised in March 2005 in Avondale Shopping 
Centre in Harare. As other galas, the event was broadcast live on ZBC and the line-up was 
dominated by popular young ‘urban grooves’ artists such as Rocqui, M’afriq, Maskiri, Stunner, 
Double Trouble, Afrika Revenge, Taurai, Themba & Victor and Betty Makhaya. Often referred 
to as ‘born-frees’, youth in Zimbabwe have been distinguished from the older generation that 
witnessed colonialism. The event was effectively a pungwe, lasting from Saturday afternoon 
until early Sunday morning, thereby associating itself with the all-night gatherings organised 
during the liberation war. While pungwes during the 1970s sought to motivate young people into 
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joining the struggle, the ‘Freedom Youth Hangout’ served to remind young Zimbabweans of the 
situation of ‘freedom’ during which they were born and the importance of retaining this freedom 
by standing up against ‘imperialist’ forces such as the MDC. During the event, t-shirts were 
handed out with a logo that included the conical tower of Great Zimbabwe that has now become 
primarily associated with the logo of the ruling party ZANU-PF. While the t-shirt itself did not 
explicitly mention ZANU-PF, inclusion of the Great Zimbabwe conical tower in the design 
indicated a subtle reference to the ruling party. Both the ‘national youth service programme’ and 
the ‘Freedom Youth Hangout’ concert intended to glorify the heroic nature of ex-combatants and 
invited youth to play a similarly ‘heroic’ role in the struggle against ‘imperialism’ in the 2000s as 
exemplified through the MDC. 
 
Unity day  
Like the Independence Day and Heroes’ Day celebrations, Unity Day obtained a new meaning in 
the political climate of the 2000s. While the original Unity Day celebrations served to 
commemorate the signing of the 1987 Unity Accord between ZANU-PF and ZAPU, the 
government began to re-emphasise the importance of ‘unity’ against the background of the rising 
popularity of a new opposition party MDC.61 The MDC was represented as a party that 
threatened the unity of Zimbabwe as is demonstrated for example in the following extract from 
an article that appeared in The Herald:  
 
[T]he unity among Zimbabweans has been constantly attacked by the country’s detractors and those 
who want to manipulate its people. Western nations, particularly Britain, are now employing some 
devious means of dividing Zimbabweans by creating and funding opposition political parties. The 
funded opposition parties such as the MDC are often dangerous and are bent on dividing the people 
along tribal lines. The British sponsored violence in the country by funding the MDC to embark on 
mass protests soon after the presidential election last year. They even tried to evoke tribal sentiments 
by manufacturing a document alleging that the Government had hatched a scheme to exterminate the 
Ndebeles.62 
 
The MDC was considered a party bent on destroying the ‘national unity’ that was introduced 
with the Unity Accord in 1987. However, ‘national unity’ was primarily defined in terms of a de 
facto one-party state in which ZANU-PF had exclusive, monopoly rule. The MDC was presented 
as a direct threat to unity. For example, during a rally in Umzingwane District, Matabeleland 
South in the run-up to the March 2005 parliamentary elections, Mugabe put it as follows: 
 
We are a people-oriented Government, a people-oriented party in the first place. It is the interests of 
the people we look at as we formulate our programmes. But we would want the people to be with us. 
Give us the necessary support. It is that oneness that we require and it must be demonstrated once 
every five years. And now I ask: Are you going to demonstrate that unity by voting for Zanu-PF in 
the parliamentary elections?63 
 
This call for unity was particularly invoked during rallies in Matabeleland because of the 
resonance that the concept of ‘unity’ had in that part of the country. The Unity Accord was 
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concluded between ZANU and ZAPU, and ZAPU had enjoyed particular appeal in 
Matabeleland. Similarly, the MDC had managed to obtain widespread support in Matabeleland 
since the 2000 parliament elections. ZANU-PF’s evocation of ‘unity’ thereby to some extent 
intended to remind inhabitants of the province of the importance of not showing themselves as 
‘dissidents’ as government alleged they had done during the 1980s through their support to 
ZAPU. The government’s emphasis on ‘unity’ also served to intimidate Matabeleland residents 
who were well aware of the implications of not supporting ZANU-PF as was evidenced by the 
violent military operation carried out by government in the 1980s to conquer Matabeleland and 
the Midlands regions through the destruction of PF-ZAPU. 
On the other hand, the government was at pains in its encounters in Matabeleland to 
emphasise that ZANU-PF did not only represent ZANU but also included PF-ZAPU. Many 
residents of Matabeleland believe that ZANU-PF effectively swallowed PF-ZAPU at the time of 
the Unity Accord in 1987. For them, ZANU-PF equals the ZANU before 1987. This view was 
for example echoed by former head of intelligence at ZIPRA and later Minister of Home Affairs, 
Dumiso Dabengwa64, who in December 2007 explained the signing of the Unity Accord as 
follows: 
 
Some of us were very reluctant to sign the unity agreement with ZANU then. We were convinced 
that there was no serious commitment to the unity cause on the part of our comrades on the other 
side, which was ZANU. There were a number of pointers that made us reluctant to sign the 
agreement, but were convinced by our leader [Joshua Nkomo] that signing would bring about good 
things to us as well as to the people whom we were fighting on behalf of […] One of the main 
reasons why we had to enter into unity was that we sought an end to the suffering and killing of the 
people of Matabeleland by Fifth Brigade. It was like a forced agreement because some of the leaders 
in ZAPU had been thrown in jail and the only way their freedom was to be sought was through their 
agreement to sign the unity accord. To a larger extent, unity was achieved in an unbalanced and 
forced manner, given that the government had failed to crush the dissident activities that were 
spreading all over the Matabeleland region […]. Even the appointment of cabinet ministers is still an 
issue up to this day. We had hoped there would be balance in the appointments but we have realized 
that most of the young men from the ZAPU side are appointed only as deputies, which raises the 
question whether they are incapable of performing the same duties performed by their ministerial 
colleagues from Zanu-PF. We need to revisit this unity accord and put right those disparities that 
have been pointed out by the people because this is a people’s party.65 
 
To try and create an impression of harmony and unity between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU in 
Matabeleland, Mugabe emphasised the contribution of both liberation movements in his 
speeches in the province. In relation to the liberation war, Mugabe stated the following during a 
visit to a school in Matobo District, Matabeleland South: ‘We were oppressed, but we fought that 
as a united people and we should fight as a united people, as our present shows that we are not 
united. We fought the war as a united front as ZIPRA and ZANLA and we were united against 
the enemy. This unity we must keep’.66 In another speech in Victoria Falls, Matabeleland North, 
Mugabe also made an explicit reference to ZAPU when he stated that: ‘ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU 
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are the liberation parties of this country. We are the custodians of the independence of Zimbabwe 
and we will forever jealously guard that hard-won freedom’.67 
In order to celebrate the signing of the 1987 Unity Accord, the first edition of the ‘Unity 
Gala’ was symbolically held at Great Zimbabwe national monument in Masvingo Province in 
December 2001. Great Zimbabwe has not only functioned as a national symbol but since the 
signing of the Unity Accord also features on ZANU-PF’s official party logo, underlined by the 
slogan “unity, peace and development”. While no explicit political statements were made nor 
were there direct references to party politics, it was clear that the event neatly fitted into the 
furtherance of ZANU-PF’s political agenda. The state newspaper The Herald further affirmed 
this in the following extract from an article: 
 
Fittingly, the venue is the historical national monument, from which the vast and beautiful country 
derives its name, Dzimba Dzemabwe – Houses of Stone. Being the largest and most significant 
ancient monuments in Africa South of the Sahara, the Great Zimbabwe is a tribute of unity, power 
and authority for the rulers of Zimbabwe […]. Unity Day will be celebrated in Masvingo, where the 
Third Chimurenga, Zimbabwe’s current land revolution, kicked off on February 16 2000.68 
 
Great Zimbabwe was thus not only a powerful national and party symbol but it was also near 
Masvingo where residents had started the occupations of white-owned farms in 2000. However, 
what the newspaper article failed to highlight was that Masvingo Province was not merely a 
‘revolutionary’ location that supported ZANU-PF but also should be seen as an area 
characterised by intra-party dissent and growing support for the opposition. In the second half of 
the 1990s, two factions emerged within Masvingo’s ZANU-PF structures. One faction was led 
by the Masvingo Provincial Governor Josaya Hungwe under the auspices of Vice-President 
Simon Muzenda. Both remained loyal to President Mugabe. The other faction, which was headed 
by Eddison Zvobgo, had strong support among the local Karanga population who saw Zvobgo as 
a suitable successor to Mugabe. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, the opposition MDC 
managed to win two seats in Bikita West and Masvingo Central districts, and nearly obtained a 
victory in Bikita East, Chiredzi North and Masvingo North. Zvobgo’s critique of Mugabe’s rule 
meant that he was demoted to Minister without Portfolio in the 1990s and was dropped from 
cabinet altogether after the 2000 parliamentary elections. In the run-up to the 2002 presidential 
elections, he refused to campaign for President Mugabe, and was accused of supporting the 
opposition party MDC. The government’s message of ‘unity’ as mediated through the gala 
therefore had an extra bearing in Masvingo Province, and particularly three months before the 
2002 presidential elections in December 2001 when the Unity Gala took place.  
The Unity Gala, however, was not successful in bringing about ‘unity’ and resulted in local 
communities in the Masvingo area feeling marginalised by the event. As Joost Fontein has 
argued, the appropriation by the ZANU-PF government of Great Zimbabwe as a national 
monument of great archaeological significance has frequently been contested by local Karanga 
communities resident around the monument.69 In the eyes of local community members around 
Masvingo, Great Zimbabwe had become an object that had been appropriated by the state and 
these tensions were also clearly expressed during the Unity Gala. While local communities were 
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not granted access to the site for religious rituals, the state had complete control and was able to 
use the monument as a venue for a music festival. A leader in the Masvingo area, Chief Murinye, 
complained about government’s selection of Great Zimbabwe as a location for the Unity Gala: 
 
How could the government allow a gala to be held at the Great Zimbabwe monument? You can’t 
organize a function at a sacred place and have drunken youths and promiscuous elders coming to 
engage in sexual activities and to defecate the shrine. Has anything like that happened in our history? 
They even allowed musicians to come and play their guitars. These instruments have not been played 
at the shrine since the monuments were constructed.70  
Chiefs in the area felt that government should have consulted them before holding a musical 
festival at the sacred site. For example, Chief Mugabe was quoted as saying the following: ‘I am 
aware that some people have gained mileage out of it, but this is unacceptable. You can not come 
and hold celebrations at this sacred place without consulting with the traditional leadership’.71 
However, the Masvingo Governor, Josaya Hungwe, disputed this view and argued that 
government did not require permission from local chiefs as it was a national monument. Chief 
Murinye blamed the road accidents in June 2002 which killed 48 people on the lack of 
consultation of the organisers with local chiefs, and this had angered ancestral spirits. As he 
warned: ‘I don’t want to frighten people, but mark my words, a lot of disasters will occur in the 
province unless Zanu PF swallows its pride and rectifies its stupid mistake’.72 The incident 
demonstrated the tensions between the national and the local where Great Zimbabwe has 
gradually been transformed into an official state and party site from which local communities 
have been excluded. The mediation of unity through the Unity Gala ironically revealed the 
contested nature of the process of nation-building. 
 
‘Umdala Wethu’ 
The increasing use of previously ‘regionalised’ and ‘tribalised’ leaders such as Joshua Nkomo 
has resulted into levels of discontent similar to the appropriation of Great Zimbabwe as national 
and party symbol. Despite the uncomfortable relationship between Nkomo and ZANU, he 
proved to be of renewed use to ZANU-PF after his death in 1999. While in the 1980s, Nkomo 
was considered as a threat to the nation, he was celebrated as a hero in the changed context of the 
2000s, and reinscribed into the nation. In the new context of an emerging opposition party in the 
2000s, Nkomo’s willingness to sign an agreement with ZANU-PF enabled government to depict 
him as a visionary who saw the value of national unity. Furthermore, Nkomo’s emphasis during 
his time as Vice-President on black economic empowerment and a resolution to the land issue 
also made it possible for the ZANU-PF government to represent him as a major champion for 
land reform which was the party’s major campaign issue. For example, during an official 
ceremony to commemorate Nkomo in July 2002, President Mugabe stated as follows: 
 
We remember him as the Father of Zimbabwe, as the one who pioneered the struggle and one who 
was committed to the very end to liberate his people and after liberation wanted the people to get 
their land. We also remember him as father of the family and politically, as father of all of us. But 
what’s important now is that we should follow his steps on those things that he showed us as virtues 
and that he wanted done. And the things he emphasized most were, firstly, the unity of all 
Zimbabweans. That unity is important as the basis on which we can put our minds together, our 
energies together, and work as one and for the good of us all, the good of our children. The second 
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issue is land and this issue must be resolved in the interests of the people of Zimbabwe. Therefore 
imperialism must never be allowed to thrive and prosper in Zimbabwe.73 
 
By associating Nkomo with major ZANU-PF campaign issues, the party sought to gain support 
in Matabeleland where the opposition party had become increasingly popular. In order to drum 
up support, the ruling party equated voting for ZANU-PF with giving support to Nkomo and 
opting for MDC was presented as abandoning Nkomo’s belief in unity. For example, in a speech 
during a visit to Joshua Mqabuko High School in Matobo District, Matabeleland (where Nkomo 
was born), Mugabe criticised residents for having given their support to the MDC in previous 
parliamentary and local elections: 
 
You gave your school the name Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo on your own volition. On the other hand, 
you say you want the MDC and Tsvangirai. What contradiction is that? Do you still have Nkomo in 
mind? Do you have him in your heart? I heard the schoolchildren here singing a tune that says 
Nkomo is still alive. That is as it should be. However, we should show that he is still alive in our 
hearts, in our minds, in our whole lives […]. He taught us to be united. He also taught us to be the 
owners of our land and to suffer for our land; to defend our land so it is not sold to the enemy.74 
 
The revival of Nkomo’s legacy and the silence on the ruling party’s treatment of Nkomo in the 
1980s was expressed most strongly through the introduction of the Umdala Wethu (‘Our Father’ 
in siNdebele) Music and Cultural Gala which was launched in Harare in July 2001 and from then 
on served as an annual commemoration of Nkomo’s death. After the Harare launch in 2001, the 
gala rotated annually in different provinces such as Manicaland (Mutare) in 2002, Midlands 
(Gweru) in 2004, Matabeleland South (Beitbridge) in 2005, Bulawayo in 2006 and Mashonaland 
East (Marondera) in 2007. The rotation of the event in provinces throughout Zimbabwe served to 
reinforce Nkomo’s status as ‘Umdala Wethu’, father of the nation.75  
While Nkomo passed away in July 1999, it was only in July 2001 that the musical gala 
was introduced, reinforcing the idea that political motivations were behind introduction of the 
gala. After ZANU-PF’s loss of a significant number of parliamentary seats in the June 2000 
elections, the gala was introduced in 2001 in order to gain support particularly from 
Matabeleland voters. However, a number of Nkomo’s colleagues and friends distanced 
themselves from ZANU-PF’s efforts to appropriate Nkomo as national hero. For example, the 
former secretary-general of ZAPU and former Matabeleland North governor, Welshman 
Mabhena, criticised the party as follows: ‘If an elderly person dies, and is respected, honoured 
and buried, he can no longer be used for people’s gain. He must be given the reverence he 
deserves, which has not been the case with Nkomo’.76 Similarly, Max Mkandla, a former ZIPRA 
soldier, stated: ‘As a former Zipra cadre, my heart bleeds when I see Zanu PF trying to get 
political capital out of a man who was forced to go into exile, fleeing from the very same party 
that wants us to believe that he was its stalwart.’77 
 
Conclusion 
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This article has demonstrated some of the shifting characteristics of Zimbabwean nationalism 
capturing the context within which cultural nationalism was brought back into the centre of 
national politics by ZANU-PF at the beginning of 2000s. While pre-colonial culture played an 
important role during the nationalist struggle in the 1960s and 1970s in order to give legitimacy 
to the claim of guerrilla fighters to take over the Rhodesian state, the cultural legacy of the 
liberation struggle came to occupy a central role in ZANU-PF’s project of cultural nationalism in 
the early 2000s which sought to legitimise the ruling party’s continued rule over Zimbabwe. 
After the failure of the developmental nationalism of the 1980s and the disastrous economic 
consequences of liberalisation policies, the ruling party was faced with a crisis of legitimacy. 
While land was a crucial material resource in ZANU-PF’s struggle for power, histories and 
memories of the liberation war also proved an essential resource which could easily be mobilised 
in order to justify ZANU-PF’s continued reign of the country.  
The music gala formed a key part of this revival of cultural nationalism and aimed to 
popularise the commemoration of national days and ‘national heroes’ part of the elite 
memorialism of the 1980s by linking with the pungwe tradition of the 1970s liberation war. Like 
the pungwe, galas sought to instil ‘patriotism’ into those most likely to vote for the opposition 
MDC such as youths and urbanites. Through the mixture of new ‘urban grooves’ tunes and old 
Chimurenga songs, the gala sought to seduce ‘born-frees’ into the nationalist project. The 
televised nature of all music galas ensured that especially those resident in the cities were 
reached, given that 80 percent of high-density urban residents has access to television (compared 
to only 22 percent in rural areas).78  
The national imaginary that was promoted through the music galas was by no means an 
inclusive definition of the ‘nation’ but should rather be seen as the mediation of a ‘party-nation’. 
Within the ceaseless drive to authenticate ZANU-PF’s liberation credentials and to inscribe itself 
into every structure and institution, such concepts as ‘independence’, ‘unity’ and ‘hero’ proved 
particularly relevant to ZANU-PF in the specific political context of the 2000s in which the 
party’s rule was increasingly challenged by the increasing competition from the opposition 
MDC. In the early 2000s, the concept of ‘independence’ no longer strictly referred to the 
moment of 1980 but also became associated with Zimbabwe’s continuing struggle for autonomy 
and sovereignty in the face of a new opposition party that was portrayed as representing the 
interests of the ‘Empire’: Britain and their ‘kith and kin’ in Zimbabwe, i.e. white Zimbabweans. 
Similarly, the notion of ‘national hero’ did not only include the ‘fallen heroes’ of the liberation 
struggle but was also used to refer to the ‘new heroes’ of the Third Chimurenga.  
While the ‘party-nation’ communicated through the galas was highly exclusionary, it was 
at the same time inclusive in the sense that it came to incorporate old enemies which were 
previously excluded from government’s national imaginary. Official versions of the nation in the 
early 1980s often ignored the contribution made by ZIPRA and ZAPU to the liberation of 
Zimbabwe, as was for example evidenced by the dominance of ZANU on ZBC in the early 
1980s. However, in the early 2000s, it was no longer ZIPRA and ZAPU but the MDC that 
constituted ZANU-PF’s major enemy. In this context, ZAPU, ZIPRA and its leader Joshua 
Nkomo were then in some occasions reinscribed into official versions of the nation, as was for 
example demonstrated through the ‘Umdala Wethu’ gala which suddenly began to hail Nkomo 
as ‘father of the nation’. However, on other occasions, these forces remained unacknowledged as 
was the case in the early 1980s. While ZIPRA and ZAPU received recognition in the ‘Umdala 
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Wethu’ and ‘Unity Gala’, their contribution to Zimbabwe’s independence was again neglected in 
the ‘Heroesplush’ gala which was held in Chinhoyi and Chimoio and hereby particularly sought 
to emphasise the contribution of ZANU and ZANLA forces to the liberation of Zimbabwe.  
The concept of ‘unity’ was thus not invoked consistently and universally, neither was it 
applied in a positive and embracing manner. The government particularly resorted to calls for 
unity in those areas where the MDC had obtained popular support such as Matabeleland and 
Masvingo provinces. Both the ‘Umdala Wethu’ and ‘Unity Gala’ addressed voters in these areas 
to remain ‘united’ and to continue to give their support to the ruling party. Especially in 
Matabeleland where memories of Gukurahundi were still vivid, government’s emphasis on 
‘unity’ served to remind citizens about the potential consequences of not supporting the ruling 
party. Like in the 1980s, unity was thus equal to compliance and assimilation rather than 
inclusion and tolerance of diversity.  
The revival of cultural nationalism in the early 2000s could be seen as ZANU-PF’s 
attempt to deal with the fragility of the national project. While the coercion, violence and 
intimidation used by government have been extensively reported, the range of cultural activities 
used by the state to produce loyal subjects has received less attention. Despite ZANU-PF’s 
efforts, the different tensions which arose around the music galas demonstrate the failure of 
government to create consent and reveal the continuing challenges the government faces to build 
a coherent nation.  
